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Consultation in a British Company 
 
 
 
 
Abstract.  
 
This paper analyses the qualities required for a union to respond effectively to 
management consultation demands.  It examines consultation in a British 
utilities company since privatisation from interview, documentary and archival 
sources.  Highly developed formal consultative procedures existed under 
nationalisation.  Equivalent processes under privatisation made new demands 
on unions: speed of response, decentralisation and ‘direct communication’ by 
management with employees.  One niche trade union for professional 
engineers was able to deal with these demands well in relation to other 
unions. The union’s members had specific legal health and safety roles that 
were used to reduce the impact of serious job losses.  Its representatives took 
advantage of these roles, and had a range of qualities helping it to reconcile 
member and management demands. This union also successfully re-
structured to respond to management requirements in the 1990s and has 
improved its position relative to its competitors.  Consultation has therefore 
been largely ‘captured’ by one union.   
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Introduction 
 
 
This paper examines changing demands on a union made by new 
consultative arrangements in a British utilities company since privatisation in 
1989-90. By consultation is meant the process by which management obtains 
reactions from employee representatives prior to making changes that affect 
them, i.e. ‘indirect’ employee consultation is discussed.  It therefore lies 
between German-style co-determination on the one hand, where agreement 
is required, and simple information-giving on the other.  The implication of 
consultation, not always realised in practice, is that representatives can affect 
the proposed changes. In some fields, consultation is a legal requirement in 
Britain, but more commonly it is simply regarded as useful by management.  It 
is a process making demands distinct from those made by negotiation.  
 
The focus is on the circumstances under which one union showed a high 
capacity to adapt to the new environment created by privatisation and 
management policy to re-fashion consultation.  The paper therefore 
contributes to discussion of the wider issue of the capacities required by 
unions to adapt to demands for consultation.  The subject acquires interest 
from the impending large-scale extension of consultative arrangements 
common in continental Europe to Britain through the EU’s Consultation and 
Information Directive.  It is also relevant to the practice of ‘partnership’. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  First, existing literature on consultation is 
reviewed and the research issue developed from this.  Next, details of the 
case study method are provided.  After giving industry and company 
background, we then outline management policies; the bulk of the paper 
focuses on one union’s capacities to adapt to them while pursuing members’ 
interests.  Finally, conclusions are drawn.  
 
Literature 
 
Despite ‚partnership‘ generating sharp debate, discussion of consultation, a 
central component of partnership, has recently been little concerned with its 
detailed operation.  It has been the subject of surveys (Wood and Fenton-
O’Creevy, 2001) much previous theoretical work (see for example the review 
in MacInnes, 1985) and earlier case studies (Marchington, 1993) but little 
recent British case study research analysing management-union interactions.  
 
Management potentially benefits from consultation in several ways.  It may 
facilitate change, bring access to employee tacit knowledge and improve trust 
levels. British management has much discretion on consultation’s scope, 
though it has long been a statutory requirement in respect of health and safety 
and collective redundancies. Much research shows that in practice, and 
especially outside of senior management, operational pressures, reluctance to 
cede control, and ideology can lead managers to treat even legally required 
consultation perfunctorily in practice, or even to reject it.  This applies even in 
Germany where co-determination law supports consultation (Ramsay, 1977; 
Hyman, 1987; Marchington, 1993; Trinczek, 1993; Bosch et al.,1999; 
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Bahnmüller, 1996; Denham et al., 1997; Weitbrecht and Braun, 1999). Thus, 
managers, the literature suggests, have contingent commitments to 
consultation, pressurising unions if management requirements are to be met.   
 
British unions have increasingly been compelled to demonstrate their value as 
change facilitators, as management’s confidence to manage without unions 
increased in the 1990s (Edwards et al., 1998: 47). It has been argued that, to 
the extent that collective bargaining has declined, influencing management 
through consultation has become proportionately more relevant (Terry, 2003, 
2003a). He also stresses that consultation should not be understood as 
simply a ‘watered down’ form of negotiation but as a distinctive process 
making different demands on representatives and their unions. Incidence of 
the traditional British means of consultation, the Joint Consultative Committee, 
has slightly declined recently, and is now present in about one workplace in 
three (Cully et al, 1999; Gospel and William, 2003).   This seems to indicate 
declining influence with management. 
 
Unions represent employees, whose interests are not necessarily adequately 
represented by the ‘business cases’ required by managers.  Representatives 
have to try to reconcile the two (Martens, 1999).  Earlier studies drew 
attention to further difficulties for representatives because of blurred 
boundaries between formal consultative arrangements and informal 
exchanges, which members might not see as important (MacInnnes, 1985).  
Marchington and Wilkinson (2000) identified different forms of employee 
participation, and the need for representatives to co-ordinate interventions in 
all of these simultaneously may pose further difficulties.   How far unions can 
manage these problems is relevant to their usefulness to members. Unions 
may have these attributes to differing degrees; British multi-union contexts 
pose specific problems of information exchange and interest aggregation 
between unions (Hyman, 1997: 314).   
 
Without strong legal underpinning British unions, it has been suggested, will 
find it difficult to deploy and generate the required skills, especially in 
consultation on ‘difficult’ issues such as re-structuring (Terry, 2003a).  For this 
reason, our case study specifically focuses on major re-structuring post-
privatisation. The central research questions are therefore: what new 
demands are being made on unions by consultation, and, in particular, what 
capacities do they require to meet these?   
 
An in-depth case study method has been used.  The case is drawn from the 
electricity supply industry (ESI), which is part of the utilities sector, a sector 
retaining relatively high union density in British terms.  The case study 
company, as we show below, is relatively committed to a consultative style. 
There are therefore relatively favourable conditions for unions to demonstrate 
their consultative capacities. In reality, union capacities to adapt varied greatly 
and the case is interesting for the way in which it shows one relatively small 
niche union adapting well in relation to others, and coming to a dominant 
position within the process.  Its members were well protected during the 
downsizing that followed privatisation.  In short, only an exceptional union 
showed the required capacities.    
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Method 
 
The research took place between April and November 2003.  Seventeen 
semi-structured interviews were initially conducted with managers at different 
levels, trade union officials of all the unions present in the company and 
workplace representatives in Britain. Because the company was recently 
taken over by a large German company and to provide a further perspective, 
interviews with German managers and workplace representatives were 
conducted in German in Germany.  In most cases, follow-up interviews, e-mail 
exchanges and telephone discussions were held.  Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed except in three cases where respondents asked that only 
notes be taken.  The transcriptions or summary notes were then checked with 
respondents.  Company and union documentation was examined, including 
formal written agreements and internal memoranda.  Extensive archival 
deposits of union records at the Modern Records Centre, University of 
Warwick, were consulted.  These included Trades Union Congress 
correspondence with unions, records of the TGWU, AEEU  and internal union 
correspondence of the Engineers and Managers’ Association.  The EMA’s 
Executive Committee minutes for 1989-1993, were also consulted. 
 
Industry and Company Background 
 
From 1947-8 the industry was a publicly-owned vertically-integrated monopoly 
run by the Central Electricity Generating Board [CEGB] (Hannah, 1979).  At 
privatisation, the ESI was split into two companies, of which the case study 
company was the smaller. Regulation  was introduced  but competition 
increased only gradually thereafter (Newbery, 1998: 148).  Until 1998, the 
case study company remained a power generation company but it has since 
broadened its operations to include new areas such as energy trading and 
retail. New generating technologies have had a major impact.  Consolidation 
has occurred, part of a wider European re-structuring accelerated by the EU’s 
1998 Directive on electricity. Cutting employment costs has been key for the 
company, since regulation determines prices.  In the year after privatisation, 
the generating companies employed 23,300; by 1995 this became 9,600 
(Hall, 2000: 9) Employment in the case study company fell from just over 
9,000 in 1990 to around 3,000 in 2000 (Arrowsmith and Edwards, 2000). 
Increased use of contractors and functional flexibility were pursued.   These 
changes contributed to high profit levels and the company was recently taken 
over by a large German-based conglomerate based around power.  
 
 
Management Policy in the Privatised Company. 
 
The CEGB had highly developed negotiating and consultation systems (Slinn, 
1989; Ferner, 1990; Ferner and Colling, 1993), with separate national, 
regional and local structures for different grades of staff.  The system was 
highly centralised. Full-time officers generally played an important role in 
relation to lay workplace representatives (Fairbrother, 2000).  A wide range of 
substantive issues including for example job descriptions were dealt with at 
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national level, and unions tried to enforce these on local managers with the 
co-operation of CEGB national managers.  There were high levels of informal 
contact between national union officers and senior managers, who often 
developed strong relationships. Agreements required consent before change 
could occur and consultation therefore allowed unions to exert considerable 
pressure on management and particularly local management whose 
observance of national agreements was centrally monitored: 
 
‘( …) if he (John Lyons, General Secretary of the EMA: authors) didn’t 
like something it didn’t happen. And he could stop things. Managers 
sort of down the line could get something going but then if John Lyons 
found out about it, decided it was not happening, he went straight to 
the top and it got stopped’  
(Prospect National Officer) 
 
The predominant view was that consultation took as long as necessary, since 
the legal obligation to provide a continuous supply of electricity had 
paramount importance.  The process was therefore slow, and agreement 
could require years of consultation before agreement was reached (Ferner 
and Colling, 1993). 
 
The state monopoly supported high union density, and the WIRS survey 
carried out during privatisation showed the energy and water supply industries 
as having the highest density of any industry sector at 75% for all employees 
in 1990 (Millward et al., 1992: 59). At the point of privatisation, density stood 
at 80% in electricity generation. The manual unions were, in descending order 
of membership, the EETPU, GMB, TGWU and AEU (AEU, 1988).  NALGO 
also had substantial membership.  The Electrical Power Engineers‘ 
Association (EPEA), part of the federal Engineers‘ and Managers’ Association 
(EMA), later to become Prospect through merger with IPMS, had over 25,000 
full members at this point.  Many of these worked outside ESI, for example in 
distribution (EMA, 1989a). Inter-union competition was strong, especially 
between the EMA and craft unions and these tensions persisted after 
privatisation (Danford et al., 2003). The unions had weakly-developed lay 
representative structures, reflecting an ‚implicit bargain‘ with management, 
bringing social peace in return for joint regulation (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 
112-6). 
 
At privatisation, management stressed that it intended to‚ take control.  It left 
the national institutional set up to build company bargaining and consultation 
structures. Management characterised the CEGB’s consultative processes as 
slow, ‚bureaucratic‘‚‘old-fashioned‘ and unsuited to the developing competitive 
environment.  Though consultation remained important throughout the 
industry and a broadly consultative style has been widespread in privatised 
utilities (Danford et al., 2003: 156-7), few companies have formally adopted‚ 
‘partnership’.   
 
The period 1989 - 1992 established several persistent patterns which have 
since remained in place in the case study company. Ferner (1990) analysed 
National Power’s internal politics during the privatisation process.  Some of 
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his findings are equally applicable to the company under discussion. Ferner 
found that in seeking to interpret the new situation and define new roles for 
themselves, managerial groups skirmished at various levels.  Corporate HR 
promoted long-term changes in the cultures of management, staff and 
industrial relations.  They used events generated by privatisation to show 
capacity to think strategically and adapt to the new organizational ‘paradigm‘.  
Their discourse stressed radical change in future, but a current need for 
stability.  Line managers could over-react to new corporate messages, a 
finding later confirmed by Mulholland (2002). Objective circumstances 
prepared others to accept that staff and unions‘ reactions constituted an area 
of uncertainty whose reduction was critical to successful transition, thereby 
legitimising corporate HR taking a central role.   
 
Ferner’s arguments in relation to National Power have even more purchase in 
our company because of perceptions of its initial disadvantage as smaller 
than its competitor. It was initially widely accepted in the company that the 
need for a carefully managed staff reduction process was more acute 
because staff reductions would be a vital area for acquiring competitive 
advantage yet more difficult to manage with loss of relevant employees than 
in its larger competitor.  
 
Despite these similarities the two companies took different approaches in 
relation to consultation, with the company under discussion taking a less 
formalistic approach than National Power. The company placed some 
emphasis on the importance of long-term planning and on managing the 
required change processes (Jennings, 2000).  The possibility of union 
protests damaging the company’s public image, and therefore their standing 
with investors was perceived as a risk to be avoided. Management stressed a 
need for ‘no surprises‘ from either side (Arrowsmith, 2003).  Consultation 
could make an important contribution to reassuring employees during the 
dramatic upheavals that were foreseen.  It was agreed that changes in work 
processes and working time should be consulted on at an early stage in 
planning. According to a TGWU national official, a ‘visionary management 
took the unions to the heart of the company’ at this stage and engaged 
constructively. Consultation was to take place with unions at all levels, i.e. 
national, business and workplace. 
 
Within the general framework of union-based consultation, three central and 
inter-related principles informed management policy on consultation.  These 
were: speed, decentralisation, and direct communication.  These offered 
challenges and possibilities for unions and are now dealt with in turn. 
 
Speed was seen by management as of critical importance; employee 
representatives should not be allowed to slow change through consultative 
processes.  In contrast to the situation under the CEGB, the new business 
had to move quickly to gain competitive advantage.  Therefore, consultation, 
whether statutory or not, did not require representatives‘ full agreement, but 
rather an explanation of rationales and mechanisms, and reception of 
reactions, and possibly adjustments followed by implementation.  Only 
‘business case‘ arguments would be accepted unless no cost was involved 
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(as for example in cases where changes to working arrangements such as 
different shifts could be dealt with by workers rearranging their working times 
by agreement between themselves).  Within this framework, statutory 
consultation on redundancies should be conducted in a relatively expansive 
way, with adequate time given to selection. Generous terms would probably 
mean large numbers of volunteers, some of whom would need to be retained. 
The result was a consultative policy that was broader, more geared to 
obtaining ‚buy-in‘ than National Power’s.  However, all of this was secondary 
to the over-riding priority of speed.   
 
Decentralisation of decision-making was considered equally important, 
through establishing cost and profit centres.  Since these were linked to local 
management responsibilities, a corresponding decentralisation of decision-
taking and consultation arrangements was seen as essential both to 
encourage local initiative and to allow for future commercial diversification.  
Decentralised bargaining and consultation arrangements were established 
and power station managers were paid by results.  The previous practice of 
dealing with a wide range of issues through negotiating and consulting at 
national level was to be abandoned.  Since job grades and descriptions had 
been fixed in this way, one of the benefits in terms of working practices would 
be, it was hoped, that functional flexibility among skilled workers could also be 
increased, leading to labour cost economies.  
 
Direct communication with employees was the third principle. Unions would 
not be allowed to insist on union-based structures as the sole channel for 
communication with employees.  The procedural agreement on consultation 
referred throughout to employee representatives, leaving the way open for 
recognition of non-union representatives.  All kinds of communication, from 
team briefings through to use of the company intranet, were to be increased, 
and if direct consultation with employees was required then the company also 
reserved the right to do this. 
 
These principles created new conditions for unions.  Speed meant not only 
that they had to respond quickly but that they lost a means of pressurising 
management by slowing implementation.  Decentralisation implied that local 
paid officers and lay representatives had to take on many tasks previously 
undertaken by national officials.  Direct consultation loosened unions’ grip on 
the consultative process, potentially diminishing their usefulness to employees 
as employees received information without intermediaries.  It also opened the 
way for non-union elected representatives.  
 
Simultaneously, the agreements threatened unions’ collective bargaining 
function, by providing for employees to be removed from it and put on to 
individual contracts. In practice, the development of individual contracts was a 
limited and tentative process.  ‘Individual’ contracts were only applied to some 
employees and where applied, generally showed relatively little individual 
variation. Collective bargaining became a decreasingly important union 
function in the 1990s not only because of this, but also because mobilisation 
possibilities for unions were highly restricted because of widespread 
redundancy. It also increased the significance to them of consultation, already 
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important because of union members’ concerns about job security rather than 
remuneration.  
 
The EPEA 
 
Management was aware of the importance of professional engineers and their 
union the Electrical Power Engineers‘ Association (EPEA) to re-structuring. 
The EPEA played a leading role in the EMA and on occasions the two were 
virtually indistinguishable in public.  We refer to it here as the EMA unless 
specifically referring to the EPEA. The union’s members advise generalist 
managers, and supervise manual workers. Their strength in relation to other 
unions grew immediately prior to privatisation for several reasons including 
determined and adroit use of consultation, and downsizing‘s disproportionate 
impact on manual unions (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 109-110).  
 
The EPEA’s  nature as a niche trade union has been outlined elsewhere 
(Slinn, 1989; Ferner, 1990; Ferner and Colling, 1993).  A relatively small union 
of professional engineers, it had a number of particular characteristics.  It was 
a coherent, and in practice a ‘closed’ union of skilled employees (Turner, 
1962: 114). It was before privatisation a highly centralised organisation, with 
considerable power vested in its national headquarters.  It was and remains 
relatively well-resourced by high subscriptions and its self-image was of a 
highly professional organisation. It has historically paid comparatively high 
salaries to attract high-quality officers. The recruitment organiser reflected just 
before privatisation:  
 
 
‘Certainly when compared to officials of other unions, we comport 
ourselves very professionally…..the service we give our members 
generally is second to none, and they know it.  And, even more 
important, members of other trade unions know it too.  We are 
perceived to be the best’ (EMA, 1989b).  
 
The union also had a pragmatic approach to political issues. Unlike other 
unions, it did not oppose contractors nor insist on their union membership. Its 
industrial politics were relatively palatable to management and government, 
i.e. opposed to privatisation but equally clearly opposed to both the ecological 
lobby and the left-wing politics of other energy unions.  
 
Management solidified the EMA’s position in relation to other unions by 
establishing ‚single-table‘ bargaining in recognition and procedural 
agreements of 1991 and 1992. Separate negotiations for professional and 
manual workers were abolished, even though the EMA had historically 
opposed‚ single table‘ bargaining on the grounds that it would dilute their 
bargaining power. The EMA now interacted directly with other unions in 
consultation and bargaining, and its leadership determined that this should not 
erode its position.  Some advantages could be seen, among them a potential 
increase in their field of recruitment.  
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The EMA attempted to limit decentralisation in a field of special concern in the 
industry: health and safety. Traditionally, Health and Safety provisions had 
lent considerable influence to EMA members: ‘They (the EMA-authors) had a 
negative power, they had a power of veto. And that must have been a very 
frustrating thing for power station managers.’ (TGWU National Officer). The 
EMA General Secretary approached the CEO arguing for preservation of the 
national health and safety committee rather than move the issue to local level.  
National officers could provide continuity of representation and shape issues 
raised.  The overture was rejected: the proposal to make health and safety a 
local issue was maintained, ostensibly so that local managers‘ responsibility 
for results was not obscured and their capacity to resist health and safety-
based arguments defending job demarcations not undermined.  It seems 
likely that they estimated that EMA members’ capacity to affect safety issues 
could more easily be reduced through local arrangements.  The measure 
certainly had the advantage of shifting the risk of prosecution for breaches of 
health and safety law from national to local level.  
 
Senior management may have under-estimated representatives’ ability to 
continue to exert influence by using health and safety as a local bargaining 
tool.  EMA members had long had significant power resources through their 
safety functions and these have been confirmed by recent legislation. This 
exemplifies how generalisations about weak British regulation of the 
employment relationship must occasionally be qualified by recognition of 
resources given to some employees by the statutory allocation of particular 
health and safety responsibilities.  In this case, representatives took full 
advantage of the resource to protect members.  
 
The union contains many Senior Authorised Persons (SAPs), a designation 
acquired by employees authorised to work and supervise in particular areas.  
SAP‘s functions entail planning and implementing interruptions to power 
supply and their decisions have major consequences for employee safety and 
company revenue. Management rhetoric emphasises safety‘s paramount 
importance, recognising that fatalities can result from safety failures.  SAPs 
may be prosecuted by the Health and Safety Executive for their acts or 
omissions; whether the company undertakes their legal defence has been an 
issue and awareness of this can strengthen SAPs positions vis-à-vis senior 
managers by underlining SAPs individual responsibilities and thus their 
autonomy.  EMA members are also often Senior Competent Persons (SCPs), 
statutory designations currently made under the Electricity (Safety Code) 
Regulations 2003 but with earlier equivalents.  SCP status gives authority 
over where and when other employees may work through issuing permits to 
work and other safety documentation. This pressures operational managers to 
seek active co-operation from SCPs and lends the latter bargaining power 
that can operate in subtle and submerged ways.  The SCP position lends 
them authority in consultation on safety committees.  More importantly, it also 
strengthens them during consultation on work processes and redundancies, 
where future availability of SAPs or CPs is at issue since the company cannot 
carry out generation and distribution functions without sufficient SAPs and 
CPs.  They can therefore argue for SAPs and CPs jobs to be preserved from 
a position of strength.  Thus, decentralisation did not weaken professional 
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engineers‘ position as hoped for in this area. Arguably, it actually 
strengthened it by pushing an important area of consultation down to local 
level and thereby reducing its visibility to senior managers and national union 
officials.  
 
As consultation became more central to union activity, it became apparent 
that EMA representatives knew how to take advantage of their position, 
because they had numerous other advantages over manual union 
representatives.   
 
The first of these flowed from their capacity to use working time to access 
training and communicate with members.  Work intensified in the new 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine power stations; employee representatives 
experienced management and workgroup pressure not to take time off for 
industrial relations duties or training.  Time off for training conducted by 
unions and agencies independent of the company became more difficult to 
obtain.   EMA members also experienced difficulty in obtaining time off for 
training.  On the other hand, by virtue of their managerial roles, they had 
informal possibilities for communicating with members that were greater than 
those of manual union representatives.  They were therefore able to take 
more time to keep in contact with members and other managers. 
 
A second advantage was a willingness to follow a policy of constructive 
engagement with management rather than taking the position that they did not 
wish to become implicated in company decisions.  EMA representatives had 
been encouraged by their union to take the view that job loss was inevitable 
and that in-depth engagement would have to be undertaken requiring new 
methods.  This did not mean, despite management policy not to allow delay, 
that management could not be pressurised; on one occasion, an EMA official 
and a representative questioned managers for some hours on the business 
case for job loss in one area.  The official found the explanations 
unconvincing, told the manager that he would report this to members and 
obtained some modifications to the redundancies proposed.  This example is 
also relevant to the third factor: confidence to deal with managers as social 
equals, helping officers and representatives formulate, develop and articulate 
lines of questioning and to express their dissatisfaction with management 
explanations when necessary.  It was suggested by a general manual union 
(TGWU) official that this was not always shared by his unions’ 
representatives, who could on occasion be reticent when facing management.  
The fourth was a capacity to challenge management not from a local or 
sectional viewpoint, but from a ‚strategic‘ overview of the business as a whole.  
Several respondents suggested that manual workers’ representatives were 
generally much more limited in their experience of the business, as the nature 
of their jobs and the restricted mobility around even one site which they 
entailed did not in practice allow them to acquire an overview in the same 
ways.  This capacity was particularly valued by central management, who 
stressed the importance of this broad view in creating value for them in the 
process.  They saw no contradiction between this view and allowing local 
managers to restrict time off for training (paid for from local budgets) for 
representatives. Fifth, as managers, their training and access to information 
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meant they could effectively explore the possibilities of constructing viable 
‚business cases‘ that also maximised the potential for simultaneously 
defending their members‘ interests.  In fact, this could be pursued not only 
through the formal consultation procedures, but also through their day-to-day 
interactions with other managers.  These helped them to obtain information 
unavailable to manual workers.  These interactions were also ways through 
which informal solutions to members’ problems could be tested with senior 
managers by ‘casual’ interchanges.  This capacity was also related to the fact 
that they had technical and related computational skills lacked by generalist 
managers; they could raise issues in ways that put interlocutors on the 
defensive.  Arithmetical skills were long ago recognised as an asset to the 
cotton unions‘ negotiators, where complex piece-work systems were used 
(Turner, 1962: 283).  Computational skills beyond the arithmetic are also 
relevant to consultation in power, where more complex technical 
considerations are frequently significant and this was recognised by other 
unions.      
 
There was also a further factor: their union’s capacity to re-structure itself to 
adapt to management demands and to assist representatives. We turn now to 
this. 
 
Union re-structuring. 
 
Much of the EMA’s membership worked in ESI and it was therefore both 
focussed and highly exposed.  Adaptation was manifestly imperative. The 
leadership rejected a defensive merger strategy, responding instead with a 
dual policy: external co-operation and internal consolidation.  It had already 
begun co-operation (though it later rejected merger) with the British 
Association of Colliery Managers (BACM) and the British Air Line Pilots 
Association (BALPA), for efficient sourcing of legal and pension facilities.  By 
September 1990, the second path was embarked on: ‚internal unification‘ 
between the EPEA and the other EMA constituents, principally the 
Shipbuilding Engineering and Aerospace group (SEA). This was the subject of 
a ‚consultative process‘ among members with the aim of re-structuring the 
organisation and agreeing new rules.  
 
Internal unification‘ improved the EPEA’s resources and influence within the 
EMA, and their capacity to conduct effective consultation. The first 
achievement was to ensure that merger, with its considerable attendant 
distractions and disruptions (Dempsey and McKevitt, 2001) was not required.  
This was important in that it meant that attention could be focussed on the 
new tasks rather than on a merger process. Eventually, merger was 
undertaken in 2000, when the EMA merged with the civil service union IPMS 
to form Prospect, but by this point the EMA had stabilised the situation thrown 
up by privatisation in the early 1990s and the merger was not forced. The new 
EMA rules had taken EPEA rules as their basis and alternative proposals 
were rejected.  The new arrangements were adopted despite SEA criticism 
that the new rules favoured the EPEA since, inter alia, they had 
disproportionate representation on the executive. Officers were re-allocated 
from head office to localities, bringing paid officers geographically closer to 
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representatives and local units, to respond to decentralisation. Members had 
previously been grouped geographically in branches, but were now grouped 
by company.  The case study company had effectively dictated this change as 
it made clear that it would not accept union policy being made by non-
employees of the company.  Although a response to company demands, this 
also facilitated improved  networking and information exchange between 
representatives within companies.  Perhaps the most important change was 
that officers could respond to company demands for speed.  As management 
processes were streamlined to speed up decision processes, the EMA 
flattened its own hierarchies. Union officers were given more freedom to act 
on their own initiative by the new rule book.  A greater degree of 
independence was seen to be essential successful for consultation by another 
union’s official: 
  
‘You gotta understand you’re not there as a delegate, you’re not there 
mandated, you’re there as a representative to make judgements, that’s 
the biggest difficulty in the consultative processes. People think that 
they are there as amplifiers of the member’s wishes but not to exercise 
judgements.’    
 
Devolution to the workplace meant that workplace representatives’ 
responsibilities grew. The EMA reacted by intensifying its education efforts. In 
this it tries to develop an encompassing business understanding in members, 
it  builds on members’ existing expertise in developing arguments that are the 
basis of influencing management.    
 
Re-structuring was swiftly accomplished. One EMA officer commented in 
relation to the case study company:  
 
 ‘Our union took a very clear decision to restructure ourselves, so that 
we could be much more speedily responsive to any consultation 
requests.  And for a little while we actually sat and waited.  Because 
the management hadn’t restructured themselves’. 
   
This illustrates how suited the union was to meet management demands for 
speed in consultation.  
 
These measures consolidated EMA’s already strong position in the industry. 
They made the union capable of responding to the requirements of speed and 
decentralisation.  No other union made comparable changes.  Their main 
competitor, the AEU (later part of Amicus), did make efforts to network shop 
stewards in power generation (Rooney, 1991), but they did not streamline 
their procedures in comparable ways.  All of the other unions were involved in 
considerable organisational change through merger and in any event were 
relatively poorly resourced.  All these unions were also to some extent general 
unions, which had to service multiple constituencies with declining resources.  
Those unions closest to the ‘general’ union model, the TGWU and GMB, 
suffered most.   
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The EMA’s internal consolidation was the organisational basis for its capacity 
to fulfil a specific ‚bridging‘ role in consultation and negotiation.  This role 
meant that they played a key role in aggregating interests and mediating 
between the unions as a whole and management. Managers and union 
officers alike expected EMA officers to act as sounding boards for proposals, 
and as leader of the union side in consultation.  
 
The central outcome has been that only two unions currently remain real 
forces in the company: Prospect and Amicus.  Prospect, from being a 
relatively small player in the industry, is now the second largest union in 
power supply after Amicus.  It was suggested by some respondents that this 
is because their members‘ skill levels protected them.  However, the 
argument was rejected by others, including a TGWU official who argued 
strongly that it was because of their relatively successful defence of members’ 
jobs through the consultation process. The two appear intertwined, but 
Prospect has claimed inroads into Amicus membership and increased its 
employee ‚market share‘.  Arguments related to EMA members‘ safety 
functions were effectively deployed in consultations on which jobs were to be 
made redundant.   
 
Attributes other than Prospect’s ability to consult effectively were involved as 
far as employees were concerned.  For example, the union also responded 
well to the development of individual contracts by setting up a large database 
through which members could compare their contracts with others in the 
same grade.  Yet the central significance of job security for employees tends 
to suggest that the consultation capacity was also of at least some importance 
in the union’s increased market share.  As far as the union’s utility to 
management is concerned, this was confirmed by corporate HR managers, 
who said that it had played a key role in ‘getting the union side together’.  In 
the late 1990s, some unit managers questioned the utility of union-based 
consultation in general, but this challenge was defeated by corporate HR 
which argued it would be needlessly risky to change successful 
arrangements.  Thus, the union was able to meet both its members and 
central HR’s requirements.   
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Conclusion 
 
The research questions posed at this paper’s outset concerned the demands 
made on unions by consultation and what capacities they need to meet these. 
These are now revisited. 
 
The qualified, contingent and in practice uneven nature of the company’s 
commitment to consultation through unions is clear, consistent with the 
literature.  Arrangements are mainly driven by pragmatism and the corporate 
HR function, prompting the question of whether, when the main gains from 
down-sizing have been achieved, they may be reviewed.  Internal 
management questioning of the union basis of consultation increased as the 
business diversified, but HR successfully defended it, qualified by pragmatic 
toleration of considerable local variation. HR management perceived the 
existing consultative arrangements as successful, argued that they could 
continue to be so, and defeated alternative arguments from operational 
managers.  
 
The EMA/Prospect is certainly a union with unusual attributes, flowing from its 
‘closed’ structure, and professional membership, with their resources, skills 
and links to management at different levels. EMA members played a ‚bridge‘ 
role at work, mediating between senior management’s requirements and 
manual workers implementation. They performed a similar role in formal 
consultation. Supported by significant aspects of safety law, they could disrupt 
without industrial action, make ‚business cases‘ and challenge from their 
expertise.  These were major power resources in consultation on 
redundancies.  They also had more possibilities for time off for information 
gathering and training, eliding the boundaries between professional and union 
responsibilities, possibilities less available to their manual counterparts.  They  
showed a capacity to obtain information, make inputs at a strategic level, the 
confidence to assert their interests and use informal channels. They balanced 
low-level sanctions and constructive engagement in the consultation process. 
 
At the institutional level, the EMA improved officer coverage, and allowed 
quicker responses to company initiatives by streamlining internal reporting 
procedures. It also developed a computerised information service for 
members on individual contracts, allowing members to benchmark 
arrangements proposed to them against other similar contracts.  Thus, 
Prospect’s competitive advantage in relation to other unions lay not only in its 
capacity to defend members through consultation but also in its simultaneous 
adaptation to a reduced collective bargaining function. The EPEA‘s niche 
nature was a key factor in initiating these changes and implementing them 
speedily, since the strength of the threat initially posed by privatisation was 
manifest to members.  The EPEA followed a dual policy of external 
collaboration and ‚internal unification‘ within the EMA.  Though Ferner and 
Colling (1993) had felt the EMA would not long be able to resist merger, they 
did so for ten years until their position in the industry had stabilised and they 
merged with IPMS largely on their terms.  
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Thus, management policies and union re-structuring interacted to reinforce 
and reproduce existing intra-employee and intra-union hierarchies.  For 
manual workers, who previously had separate consultative arrangements, 
these developments may have had negative effects. Consultation’s 
advantages, including its wider democratic benefits, may accrue differentially 
within workforces.  This is important, because it has implications for those less 
well-positioned and skilled at defending their positions.  For them, increased 
consultation may involve surrendering tacit knowledge with little balancing 
compensation.  There may therefore be instances within ‚partnership‘ where 
occupational groups more capable of seizing opportunities presented by 
consultation may benefit disproportionately.  
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